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Displacement
The federal Housing and Home Finance Agency, Washington’s Redevelopment Land Agency (RLA), and the U.S. Supreme Court all strongly endorsed plans to reduce low-income housing in Southwest Washington, D.C. Government officials were far less united in re-housing displaced residents. Far from a unified, official undertaking, urban renewal in 1950s Washington was a complicated process to carry out.
Relocation
The issue of relocation was a constant conflict mainly between two government agencies, the RLA and the National Capital Housing Authority (NCHA). John Ihlder – the Progressive Era housing reformer – had been a strong advocate of conservative redevelopment plans and new housing units for displaced Southwest residents. Since the Housing Authority was responsible for administering public housing, Ihlder was keenly aware of the shortage of low-income units available city-wide. In January 1952, the waiting list for D.C. public housing was 8,000 names long.1
in January 1952, the waiting list for D.C. public housing was 8,000 names long
Compounding the awkward relationship between the housing authority and urban renewal agency, the RLA was nominally responsible for building new public housing projects. As the NCHA identified suitable sites for these buildings, it required the power of the RLA to acquire and develop the land on behalf of the District of Columbia. As late as 1960, both agencies disagreed on site selection, further complicating NCHA’s work meeting low-income families’ needs.
The RLA and NCHA were forced to collaborate to relocate Southwest residents. James Banks of the NCHA led the effort, deploying agents with no social work experience door-to-door throughout the region. In 1991, Southwest resident Phyllis Martin recalled mixed emotions during a social worker visit:
It was a black social worker and a tall white guy with an attaché case. And over the years, not knowing what’s going on… you’re scared to hear from a white man with an attaché case with a sophisticated black woman saying that ‘we’re going to give you a place to stay. You have to move out of this unit.’2
Unable to keep up with rapidly changing demolition plans or the competing goals of individual government agencies, Martin viewed the “man with an attaché case” as an intimidating representative of a monolithic government.
With no comprehensive plan to relocate families that could not find housing themselves, James Banks’ team worked diligently on a case-by-case basis with many indigent families. This often involved thrusting themselves into families’ personal lives, from finding new furniture at Salvation Army and Goodwill to pressuring one couple to marry and thus qualify for public housing.3Phyllis Martin herself was aware of Banks’ efforts to work with individual families, and she was ultimately able to remain in Southwest. The uncertainty inherent in situations such as hers demonstrates the inability for both federal and District government to coherently enact its own urban renewal process.
Whose Southwest?
Just as government bureaucracy had deterred the District of Columbia from providing adequate public housing to displaced residents, red tape also prevented private development from quickly rebuilding Southwest. When one builder dropped out in 1955, no previous bidders would accept an agreement with the RLA; once a new builder was identified, it had difficulty securing full loan backing from the Fair Housing Administration (FHA). When the Capitol Park apartment building opened in 1959, it was the first new housing in Southwest after years of demolition.
The FHA’s hesitancy to provide full backing to Capitol Park suggests that the agency was skeptical of modern, middle-class housing’s chances of success in Southwest.4 The apartment staff themselves was uncertain of the complex’s fortunes. Despite promises to provide an integrated living space, African-American applicants were not accepted until certain occupancy was already filled.
Just as relocation of displaced residents required coordination between government agencies, construction of new housing required further coordination between the RLA and FHA. In both situations, the lack of proper synchronization revealed the messy, complex nature of urban renewal at both the federal and local level.
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Pamphlet written and distributed to Southwest residents about relocation services